The Battle for Spain Read online

  On the following day, 27 April, news of the destruction of Guernica appeared in the British press. The next morning The Times and the New York Times published the article of George Steer which was to have a tremendous effect internationally.19 Aguirre denounced the event in the following words: ‘German aviators, in the service of the Spanish rebels, have bombed Guernica, burning the historic city venerated by all Basques.’20

  As with the account of Durango, the nationalists set out to reverse the story. Using the precedent of Irún, they said that the town had been destroyed by its defenders as they withdrew; Queipo de Llano specified Asturian dinamiteros.21 Franco’s GHQ issued a statement on 29 April: ‘We wish to tell the world, loudly and clearly, a little about the burning of Guernica. Guernica was destroyed by fire and gasoline. The red hordes in the criminal service of Aguirre burned it to ruins. The fire took place yesterday and Aguirre, since he is a common criminal, has uttered the infamous lie of attributing this atrocity to our noble and heroic air force.’22

  The Spanish Church backed this story completely, and its professor of theology in Rome went so far as to declare that there was not a single German in Spain and that Franco needed only Spanish soldiers, who were second to none in the world. It was a version that even Franco’s most fervent supporters abroad had difficulty in sustaining. General Roatta himself informed Count Ciano on 8 May that General Sperrle had told him that the Condor Legion had bombed Guernica with incendiaries.23 An American journalist, escorted by a Falangist, met a staff officer from the Army of the North a few months later in August. Her Falangist escort, who totally believed the story put out by Salamanca, told the staff officer that ‘reds’ in Guernica had tried to tell them that the town had been bombed from the air, not burned. ‘But of course it was bombed,’ the staff officer replied. ‘We bombed it and bombed it and bombed it, and bueno, why not?’24

  Condor Legion veterans were later to claim that their squadrons were really trying to bomb the Renteria bridge just outside Guernica, but that strong winds blew their loads on to the town. The bridge was never hit, there was virtually no wind, the Junkers were flying abreast and not in line, and anti-personnel bombs, incendiaries and machine-guns are not effective against stone bridges. According to Richthofen’s personal diary, the attack had been planned jointly with the nationalists. Mola’s chief of staff, Colonel Vigón, agreed to the target the day before the raid and again a few hours before it. No nationalist officer mentioned the importance of Guernica in Basque life and history, but even if they had, the plan would not have been changed.

  Richthofen’s war diary entry for 26 April, although terse, could hardly be clearer and completely contradicts the nationalist version of events. ‘K/88 [the Condor Legion bomber force] was targeted at Guernica, in order to halt and disrupt the Red withdrawal, which has to pass through here.’ The following day, he simply wrote: ‘Guernica burning’. And on 28 April, he wrote: ‘Guernica must be totally destroyed.’25 The Condor Legion’s Gefechtsbericht (combat report) for the day does not appear to have survived for some reason. One intention of the raid may have been to block the roads, as he wrote, but everything else points to a major experiment in the effects of aerial terrorism.26

  As the retreat continued in this sector there were several brave and effective rearguard actions. At Guernica the communist Rosa Luxembourg Battalion under Major Cristóbal held back the nationalists for a time, despite the extraordinary incompetence of their formation commander, Colonel Yartz, who appears to have been incapable of reading a map. Then, on 1 May, as the withdrawal steadied, the 8th UGT Battalion laid a highly successful trap at Bermeo, on the coast, putting 4,000 men of the Black Arrows and their Fiat Ansaldos to flight.

  For the Army of Euzkadi, however, it was now necessary to start retreating to the ‘Iron Ring’ round Bilbao. This defence works, with a perimeter of some 80 kilometres, had been started the previous winter. With 15,000 men working on it, as well as civilian contracting companies who installed concrete strong points, it was wrongly compared to the Maginot Line. It had no depth–in many places nothing more than a single line of trenches–and it was incomplete. There was no attempt at concealment and the officer in charge, Major Goicoechea, had gone over to the nationalists with its detailed plans. President Azaña had no illusions about the defensive capability of these positions. ‘What the people have called the “ring of Bilbao”…is nothing more than a fantasy. Furthermore, I fear that the city of Bilbao will not be defended when the enemy are at its gates.’27 His scepticism was echoed by Colonel von Richthofen, who commented on 29 April, ‘Photographs show that for the moment large parts of these positions have not been fortified.’ Two days later he departed on holiday, having just heard of the Condor Legion’s most serious loss of the whole war. Republican fighters had intercepted a Junkers 52 carrying seven of his fighter pilots, all of whom were killed when it was shot down.28

  The Italians were increasing the size of their forces in the north and the nationalists’ four Navarrese brigades were each brought up almost to divisional strength. The republicans, meanwhile, raised more gudari, UGT, CNT and communist battalions, and brought in Asturian and Santanderino reinforcements. The Valencia government tried to help by sending aircraft via France, but the Non-Intervention Committee frustrated it on two occasions. That the non-intervention policy was effective only on the French frontier increased republican bitterness greatly. It was thought too dangerous to fly the aircraft straight to Bilbao and risk arriving with little fuel and no protection against nationalist fighters. There were now only six Chatos left in the Basque country and, although their pilots had managed to shoot down the first two Dornier 17s to arrive in Spain, morale seemed to sink after their ace, Felipe del Río, was killed.

  Relations between the Basques and the Valencia government became strained by misunderstandings. The republican government in Valencia suspected Aguirre and his ministers of trying to arrange a separate peace, while they became convinced that help was denied them on purpose. The Republic knew that the conquest of the north would not only give the nationalists vital industries, but also release large numbers of enemy troops for deployment in the centre. They therefore planned to launch two attacks in May, the Huesca offensive and an attack in the Sierra de Guadarrama towards Segovia. Neither of these attempts, however, forced the nationalists to divert troops from the northern front.

  On 22 May the 4th Navarre Brigade reached the eastern side of the Iron Ring. The nationalists’ progress was slower as the Basques and their allies were now fighting more effectively and seemed less affected by air attack. They were beginning to fire back, a tactic which, even if not successful, kept the Fiat and the Heinkel fighters at more of a distance. (Almost a third of the Fiats destroyed in action during the war were brought down as a result of small-arms fire.)

  Some of the incompetent senior officers had also been replaced. But Aguirre’s attempts to animate the army staff during the campaign had done little to improve the situation. His interference stopped when Llano de la Encomienda was replaced by General Gámir Ulíbarri, a Basque regular officer sent from Valencia. Some new brigade and divisional commanders were also appointed, such as the remarkable mechanic, Belderrain, who had organized the effective defence of the Inchortas, Cristóbal, the communist smuggler, and the French Colonel Putz from the International Brigades. On the other hand the Russian General Goriev stayed on despite his unimpressive performance.

  A change in the nationalist command was at the same time made necessary by the death of General Mola, in an air crash, on 3 June. His death could be described as a setback for the Basques, because his caution, which so exasperated the Germans, had saved them at critical moments. On the nationalist side there were many who suspected that the Caudillo or his supporters were somehow involved, but the suspicion was almost certainly groundless. Franco’s other great rival, Sanjurjo, had died in similar circumstances, but air crashes were frequent and accounted for nearly as many lost machines as enemy action.
r />   Mola’s place was filled by General Dávila, who was also methodical, but far more stable than his predecessor. Dávila rearranged his forces, ordering the assault on the Iron Ring to begin on 12 June. Major Goicoechea’s plans, confirmed by air reconnaissance, pinpointed the weakest spot in the defence line. A bombardment with 150 artillery pieces and air attacks was swiftly followed by the advance of troops commanded by Colonels García Valiño, Juan Bautista Sánchez and Bertomeu.29 With no depth to the defences, the whole sector crumbled. Nevertheless, it was certainly not a rout. Many units held their ground and slowed the advance.

  The Basque nationalist leaders had meanwhile been in contact with the Italian government and the Vatican to try to prevent the nationalists from destroying Bilbao, as Mola had threatened.30 On 6 May, Pius XI had asked Cardinal Gomá to act as mediator. He saw Mola and obtained a promise that if Bilbao surrendered there would be no bloody reprisals. Cardinal Pacelli, the secretary of state, sent a telegram on 12 May to Aguirre proposing a separate peace for the Basque country, but the telegram was sent to the Valencia government by mistake. This caused great suspicions. Then a more collaborationist wing of the Basque Nationalist Party attempted to negotiate with the Italians through their consul in San Sebastián.

  In Bilbao the Basque government decided to evacuate the city on 16 June after agonized discussions. The Basque nationalist leaders also decided to blow up bridges, but not the steelworks and war industries. Their republican allies in Valencia were horrified when they heard of this later. The coast road to the west was soon packed with refugees and, although only a small part consisted of Santanderino units heading for home, the whole mass was strafed by Heinkel fighter squadrons. A junta of defence under Leizaola, the minister of justice, stayed in the city, while the government withdrew towards Santander. Other senior Basque officials and officers fled on ships leaving the harbour.

  The republican forces were assigned new positions along the line of the River Nervión, which curves around Bilbao to the east. With the imminent arrival of the nationalist forces the right-wing fifth columnists in Arenas, on the east of the river’s mouth, started shooting into the streets in their excitement. The anarchist Malatesta Battalion, positioned on the other side of the river, stormed across and dealt with them rapidly. Their final action before withdrawing was to set fire to the church. The commander knew that its priest was a nationalist sympathizer; he was his brother.

  The city was under continual artillery bombardment. Eventually the republican forces had to withdraw because they were threatened on their southern flank, where troops under the Italian commissar, Nino Nanetti, had withdrawn without blowing the bridge behind them. The fifth columnists in the city had another shock when they gathered in the main square with monarchist flags to greet the Carlist troops. A Basque tank suddenly appeared round the corner, fired at some nationalist flags hanging from balconies and disappeared. At five in the afternoon the 5th Navarrese Brigade under Colonel Juan Bautista Sánchez entered Bilbao. The cheers for the nationalists when they arrived sounded hollow in the half-empty city.31

  The nationalist casualties for the campaign were high–about 30,000–but the proportion of fatalities was low. The Basques and their allies suffered only slightly more in total, but their death rate was nearly a third, mainly due to air attacks. The Basque army had operated in a markedly different way from the republican army in the centre. There was far less waste of men’s lives through futile counter-attacks over open ground.

  The nationalist conquerors held summary court martials in the newly occupied territory, and thousands, including many priests, were sentenced to prison. There were, however, fewer executions than usual, because of the strength of feeling that Guernica had provoked abroad. Nothing, however, stopped the conquerors’ resolution to crush every aspect of Basque nationalism. The Basque flag, the ikurriña, was outlawed and use of the Basque language suppressed. Threatening notices were displayed: ‘If you are Spanish, speak Spanish.’ Regionalist feelings in any form were portrayed as the cancer of the Spanish body politic.

  The units which retreated along the coast to Santander were demoralized. They knew that it was only a matter of time before Santander and the Asturias fell as well. They were at least given a chance to reorganize, when the nationalist advance was delayed by the major republican offensive at Brunete in the Madrid sector on 6 July. Once this had been repulsed, General Dávila redeployed his troops. They included six Carlist brigades under General Solchaga, the Italian force now commanded by General Bastico, which comprised Bergonzoli’s Littorio Division, the March 23rd Division, the Black Flames and the mixed Black Arrows. The air support consisted of more than 200 planes, split between the Condor Legion, the Legionary Air Force and the nationalist squadrons, which were being given the Heinkel 51s as Messerschmitts arrived in greater numbers.

  General Gámir Ulibarri’s force of some 80,000 men had not only less infantry than the nationalists, but also only 40 operational fighters and bombers, many of which were obsolete. On the opening day of the offensive, 14 August, Solchaga’s Carlist brigades attacked from the east and smashed through the 54th Division. The Italians were held up by fierce resistance in the Cantabrian mountains to the south-west, but with overwhelming artillery and air support they captured the Escudo pass two days later. The three republican divisions sent to hold the breach were not quick enough and the breakthrough was complete.

  Many of the republican formations then carried out a fighting retreat into the mountains of Asturias. The remainder were bottled up in the area of Santander and the small port of Santoña. In Santander the desperation was so great that many men sought oblivion in drink. Officers organized parties of soldiers to go round destroying the wine stocks. The general staff arranged to escape in ships, but the small boats were swamped by panic-stricken men and many capsized. The 122nd and 136th Battalions tried to organize a defence, but apathy seemed to take over once the last chance of escape had gone. They waited for the nationalists and their firing squads. Since many nationalist supporters had been killed in the previous year, mainly on the orders of the socialist Neila, little mercy was expected.

  In Santoña, the Basques arranged surrender terms for their gudaris with the Italian commander of the Black Arrows, Colonel Farina. These had already been discussed in Rome between Count Ciano and Basque PNV representatives, who felt that the Valencia government had let them down badly. It was agreed that there would be no reprisals and that no Basque soldier would be forced to fight on the nationalist side. Spanish officers announced immediately that this agreement was invalid and Basque soldiers were taken off British ships in the port at gunpoint. Summary trials followed and a large proportion of the officers and many soldiers were executed. It was this dishonouring of the articles of surrender which the Basque ETA guerrillas advanced in later years as a reason why the Republic of Euzkadi was still at war with the Franquist state.32

  Mussolini and Count Ciano were overjoyed at this ‘great victory’. Ciano wanted ‘flags and guns captured from the Basques. I envy the French their Invalides and the Germans their Military Museums. A flag taken from the enemy is worth more than any picture.’33 They felt that their decision to keep Italian troops in Spain after the débâcle of Brihuega had been vindicated. Their jubilation was premature, however, for approximately half of the republican forces had pulled back into the Asturian mountains, where there was to be a much tougher campaign lasting until the end of October, followed by a further five months of ferocious guerrilla warfare. Franco was not able to bring down the Army of the North as quickly as he had hoped.

  The relative speed of the nationalists’ victory in the Basque campaign was due to the Condor Legion’s contribution. The Nazi government did not delay in taking payment. German engineers moved into the factories and steel mills which the Basque nationalists had refused to destroy and most of the industrial production went to Germany to pay the Luftwaffe’s expenses for destroying the region. Franco, on the other hand, had to wait longe
r for his benefits, although he knew that the reduction of the north would eventually give him infantry parity in the centre and south. Combined with his increasing superiority in air and artillery support, it would ensure ultimate victory, unless a European conflict broke out first. The war was now little more than straight pounding and he could pound the hardest, for this campaign had shown that his allies possessed far better means of delivering high explosive than his enemies’ allies.

  21

  The Propaganda War and the Intellectuals

  ‘History to the defeated’, wrote W.H. Auden in his poem, ‘Spain 1937’, ‘may say Alas but cannot help or pardon.’ The Spanish Civil War is one of the comparatively few cases when the most widely accepted version of events has been written more persuasively by the losers of the conflict than by the winners. This development was of course decisively influenced by the subsequent defeat of the nationalists’ Axis allies. At the time, however, the Republic may have won many battles for international public opinion, but the nationalists won the key engagement by concentrating on a select and powerful audience in Britain and the United States. They played on the fear of communism in an appeal to conservative and religious feelings, and their audience’s suspicions about the Republic were confirmed by Soviet military aid.

  The nationalists argued that they represented the cause of Christianity, order and Western civilization against ‘Asiatic Communism’. To bolster this version of events, they alleged, on the basis of forged documents,1 that the communists had planned a revolution with 150,000 shock troops and 100,000 reserves in 1936, a coup which the nationalist rising had pre-empted. They declared that the election results of February 1936 were invalid, even though CEDA and monarchist leaders had accepted the results at the time. They concentrated on presenting life in the republican zone as a perpetual massacre of priests, nuns and innocents, accompanied by a frenzied destruction of churches and works of art. And to justify their failure to take Madrid, they claimed that half a million foreign communists were fighting in Spain.2