The Battle for Spain Read online

  6 See Santiago de Pablo, Ludger Mees and José A. Rodríguez Ranz, El péndulo patriótico. Historia del Partido Nacionalista Vasco, II 1936–1979, Barcelona 2001.

  7 John Langdon-Davies, Behind Spanish Barricades, London, 1937. p. 63.

  8 For example, Josep Tarradellas, quoted in Walther L. Bernecker, Colectividades y revolución social, Barcelona, 1983, p. 386n.

  9 Solidaridad Obrera, 18 July 1937.

  10 Diego Abad de Santillán, Por qué perdimos la guerra, Buenos Aires, 1940, p. 169.

  11 Bernecker, Colectividades y revolución social, pp. 437–48.

  12 The committee went under its Catalan name of the Comitè Central de Milícies Antifeixistes. Of their five posts, the libertarians allocated three to representatives of the CNT (Durruti, García Oliver and Asens) and two to the FAI (Abad de Santilla ´n and Aurelio Fernández). Durruti and other libertarian leaders left for the front on 23 July, thus further reducing their influence (John Brademas, Anarcosindicalismo y revolución en España, 1930–1937, Barcelona, 1974, p. 175.)

  13 Ossorio, Vida y Sacrificio de Companys, p. 172.

  14 For the relationship between the Generalitat and the anarchists in the field of finance and industry, see Francesc Bonamusa in La guerra civil a Catalunya, vol. ii, pp. 54ff.

  15 Fraser, Recuérdalo tú…, p. 393.

  16 See Mary Nash, Mujeres libres: España, 1936–1939, Barcelona, 1975.

  17 Sandie Holguín, República de ciudadanos, Barcelona, 2003, pp. 209ff.

  18 RGASPI 495/120/259.

  19 The UGT or UGT-CNT organized about 15 per cent of the collectives in New Castile and La Mancha, the majority in Estremadura, very few in Andalucia, about 20 per cent in Aragón and about 12 per cent in Catalonia.

  20 The loss of markets and shortage of raw materials led to a 40 per cent decline in textile output, but engineering production increased by 60 per cent over the next nine months.

  21 Josep Maria Bricall, ‘Les collectivitzacions’ in Anna Salles (ed.) Documents 1931–1939.

  22 Franz Borkenau, The Spanish Cockpit, Michigan, 1963, p. 90.

  23 Ibid., p. 103.

  24 Brademas, Anarcosindicalismo, pp. 204–9.

  25 José Borrás, Aragón en la revolución española, Viguera, Barcelona, 1983, pp. 174ff.

  26 The areas expropriated for collectives included 65 per cent of the agricultural land in the province of Jaén, 56.9 per cent in Ciudad Real, 33 per cent in Albacete and only 13.18 per cent in the whole of the province of Valencia. See Aurora Bosch, Ugetistas libertarios. Guerra Civil y revolución en el País Valenciano, Valencia, 1983.

  27 Borkenau, pp. 155–6.

  28 G. Helsey, Anarcosindicalismo y estado en Aragón, 1930–1938, Madrid, 1994.

  CHAPTER 12: The Army of Africa and the People’s Militias

  1 Tuñón, La España del siglo xx, p. 438.

  2 Jackson, La República…, p. 248.

  3 Fraser, Recuérdalo tú…, p. 252.

  4 Tuñón, La España del siglo xx, p. 474.

  5 Kuznetsov, Bajo la bandera de la España republicana, p. 160.

  6 Zugazagoitia, Guerra y vicisitudes…, p. 135.

  7 Borkenau, The Spanish Cockpit, p. 159.

  8 Marty report to Comintern, 10 October 1936, RGVA 33987/3/832, pp. 70–107.

  9 Espinosa, La columna…, p. 52.

  10 Ibid. p. 77.

  11 Nationalist historians claim that Yagüe fell ill on 20 September.

  12 Reig Tapia, Memoria de la guerra civil, pp. 149–87.

  13 Robert Mallett, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933–1940, London 2003, p. 101.

  14 See H. R. Southworth, El mito de la cruzada de Franco, Barcelona, 1986, pp. 93–116; and Reig Tapia, pp. 149–87.

  15 According to Luis Quintanilla, Los rehenes del Alcázar de Toledo, Paris, 1967, they were shot and their bodies used to block shell holes in the wall, but this too may have been a myth.

  16 John Whitaker, We Cannot Escape History, pp. 113–114.

  17 Isabelo Herreros, El Alcázar de Toledo. Mitología de la cruzada de Franco, Madrid, 1995, p. 75.

  18 Preston, Franco, p. 235.

  19 RGVA 33987/3/845, pp. 14, 17–18.

  20 According to Hugh Thomas, Cortés’s men lived from robbing the local area (La guerra civil española, p. 334).

  21 See Seidmann, A ras del suelo, pp. 59–61.

  22 Abad de Santillán, Por qué perdimos la guerra, Madrid, 1975, p. 85.

  23 Ramón Brusco, Les milícies antfeixistes i l’Exèrcit popular a Catalunya, 1936–1937, Lérida, 2003, pp. 81–98.

  24 Bolloten, La revolución española, p. 368.

  25 Bill Alexander, British Volunteers for Liberty, London, 1982, pp. 73–4.

  26 Salas, Historia del ejército popular de la República, vol. i, pp. 1147–8.

  CHAPTER 13: Arms and the Diplomats

  1 Bennassar, La guerre d’Espagne et ses lendemains, Paris, 2005, p. 133.

  2 Bachoud, Franco, Barcelona, 2000, p. 150.

  3 D. W. Pike, Les franc¸ais et la guerre d’Espagne, Paris, 1975, p. 81.

  4 Welczek to Foreign Ministry, DGFP, p. 4.

  5 Wegener to Foreign Ministry, 25 July, 1936, DGFP, p. 9.

  6 Howson, Armas para España, pp. 45–6.

  7 On 7 and 8 August, thirteen fighters and six bombers were sent to Spain, but they were stripped of weapons and equipment. The French Potez bombers were in any case completely obsolete. Nationalist claims of large numbers of aircraft being sent earlier are without foundation.

  8 Eden, Facing the Dictators, London, 1962, p. 402.

  9 Balfour and Preston (eds), España y las grandes potencias, p. 81.

  10 Director of Legal Department, Foreign Ministry, to the German Legation in Lisbon, 7 September 1936 (DGFP, p. 78).

  11 Faupel to Wilhelmstrasse, 5 May 1937, DGFP, pp. 282–3.

  12 J. M. Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace, London, 1920.

  13 Kirkpatrick, Ivone, The Inner Circle, London, 1958.

  14 Eden, Facing the Dictators, p. 433.

  15 Bolín, Spain: The Vital Years, London, 1967.

  16 Heiberg, Emperadodores del Mediterráneo, pp. 57–60.

  17 Renzo de Felice, Mussolini il duce, vol. ii, Lo stato totalitario, p. 366.

  18 Coverdale, La intervención italiana en la guerra civil española, Madrid, 1979.

  19 Johannes Bernhardt and Adolf Langenheim, both members of the Nazi Party and based in Morocco, were accompanied by one of General Kindelán’s officers, Captain Francisco Arranz Monasterio. For the seizure of the Lufthansa aircraft in Las Palmas to take General Orgaz to Tetuán, and then the arms delegation on to Berlin, see DGFP, pp. 7–8.

  20 See Memorandum of the Director of the Political Department, Dr Hans Heinrich Dieckhoff, arguing that ‘it is absolutely necessary that at this stage German governmental and Party authorities continue to refrain from any contact with the two officers. Arms deliveries to the rebels would become known very soon’ (Dieckhoff, 25 July 1936, DGFP, p. 11).

  21 Angel Viñas and Carlos Collado Seidel, ‘Franco’s Request to the Third Reich for Military Assistance’ in Contemporary European History, II, 2 (2002), Cambridge University Press.

  22 Howson, Armas para España, p. 35.

  23 Balfour and Preston (eds), España y las grandes potencias, p. 100.

  24 Viñas, Guerra, dinero, dictadura, p. 170.

  25 Spanish industry had been dominated by foreign capital since its retarded start in the mid nineteenth century. The railways and basic services such as electricity, engineering and mining all depended on heavy foreign investment. American ITT owned the Spanish telephone system and Ford and General Motors had little competition in the motor industry. British companies owned the greatest share of Spanish business with nearly 20 per cent of all foreign capital investment. The United Kingdom was also the largest importer of Spanish goods, including over half of her iron ore (Comin, Hernández and Llopis (eds), Historia económica de España, p. 221.


  26 J. R. Hubbard, ‘How Franco financed his war’ in Journal of Modern History, Chicago, 1953, p. 404.

  27 In conversation with Charles Foltz, correspondent of Associated Press: The Masquerade in Spain, Boston, 1948, pp. 46–8.

  28 AP RF 3/74/20, p. 51.

  29 Radosh, Habeck and Sevostianov (eds), España traicionada, p. 56.

  30 Blanco Escolá, Falacias de la guerra civil, p. 167.

  31 RGVA 35082/1/185, p. 148.

  CHAPTER 14: Sovereign States

  1 Other influential officers present included Generals Orgaz, Kindelán, Dávila, Saliquet and Gil Yuste, as well as Colonels Muntaner and Moreno Calderón.

  2 Iribarren, Mola, p. 232.

  3 Gil Robles, No fue posible la paz, p. 776, n. 25.

  4 Boletín Official del Estado of 30 September 1936. Paul Preston does not believe that Nicolás Franco actually deleted the words ‘del gobierno’ from the document drawn up by the lawyer, Jose´ Yanguas Messía, but thinks that the words were not read out. The qualification ‘for the duration of the war’ does appear to have been deleted by Franco himself. The important point is that the newspapersfaithfully published a verbatim version of the speech, not the text. The best account is in Preston, Franco, pp. 221–53.

  5 ‘Caudillo’ was Franco’s new title, a Spanish term for leader roughly approximate to Führer or Duce.

  6 The various departments of the Junta Técnica were divided between Burgos, Valladolid and Salamanca, where Franco set up his headquarters with the Secretariat-General and departments for foreign affairs, as well as press and propaganda directed by Millán Astray with the help of Ernesto Giménez Caballero. The poet and president of Acción Española, José María Pemán, took over the Commission of Culture and Education. There, with the assistance of Enrique Súñer, he began a systematic purge of university professors and lecturers.

  7 Zugazagoitia, Guerra y vicissitudes, p. 153.

  8 Koltsov, Ispanskii Dnevnik, quoted by Bolloten, La revolución española, p. 189.

  9 RGVA 33987/3/852, p. 46.

  10 Marty’s report to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, 10 October 1936, RGVA 33987/3/832, pp. 70–107, Radosh and Habeck, pp. 40–55.

  11 The cabinet consisted of president of the council of ministers and minister of war: Francisco Largo Caballero; foreign affairs, Julio álvarez del Vayo; minister of the interior, Angel Galarza; finance, Juan Negrín; navy and air, Indalecio Prieto; industry and commerce, Anastasio de Gracia (all PSOE); justice, Mariano Ruiz Funes (Izquierda Republicana); agriculture, Vicente Uribe (communist); education, Jesús Hernández (communist); work and health, Josep Tomàs i Piera (Esquerra Republicana); communications and mercantile marine, Bernardo Giner de los Ríos (Unión Republicana); minister without portfolio, José Giral (Izquierda Republicana). A few days later Julio Just (Izquierda Republicana) became minister of works. Prieto wanted to bring the conservative Basque PNV into the central government and to strengthen Madrid’s influence in the north, but Aguirre, the Basque president, refused. The Basques wanted the statute of autonomy, frozen since 1934, passed as soon as possible. Manuel de Irujo joined the government as a minister without portfolio on 17 September, after the Basques had set up their own government (Santiago del Pablo (ed.), El péndulo patriótico, ii, pp. 15–18).

  12 RGVA 33987/3/832 pp. 70–107.

  13 Brusco, Les milícies antifeixistes i l’exèrcit popular, pp. 101–103.

  14 Vilar, La guerra civil española, p. 103

  15 RGVA 33987/3/832 p. 70

  16 Pablo de Azcárate, Mi embajada en Londres, p. 141.

  17 Eden, Facing the Dictators, pp. 415 and 408.

  18 Bowers, Mission in Spain.

  CHAPTER 15: The Soviet Union and the Spanish Republic

  1 The PSUC in Catalonia increased during this period of a year from 5,000 members to 45,000 and the Communist Party of Euskadi from 3,000 to 22,000, which made an approximate total of 300,000, more than the PSOE and all the republican parties together. According to José Díaz, the breakdown was as follows:

  industrial workers (including engineers and technicians): 87,660

  agricultural workers: 62,250

  landowning peasants: 76,700

  middle class: 15,485

  intellectuals: 7,045

  women: 19,300

  Total: 268 440

  It is significant that the communists attracted more landowning peasants than agricultural workers (Joan Estruch, Historia oculta del PCE, Madrid, 2000, pp. 132–5.

  2 Antonio Elorza and Marta Bizcarrondo, Queridos camaradas. La Internacional Comunista y España, 1919–1939, Barcelona, 1999, p. 305.

  3 Ivo Banac (ed.), The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov, 1933–1949, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2003, pp. 28 and 32.

  4 The main works on the subject, making use of the former Soviet archives since 1992, include: R. Radosh, M. R. Habeck and G. Sevostiano (eds), Spain Betrayed, The Soviet Union in the Spanish Civil War, Yale, 2001; Yury Rybalkin, Operatsiya ‘X’: Sovetskaya voennaya pomoshch respublikanskoi ispanii (1936–1939), Moscow, 2000; Daniel Kowalsky, La Unión Soviética y la guerra civil española. Una revisión crítica, Barcelona, 2003; Gerald Howson, Armas para España. La historia no contada de la guerra civil española, Barcelona 2000; Michael Seidman, A ras de suelo. Historia social de la República durante la guerra civil, Madrid, 2003; A. Elorza and M. Bizcarrondo, Queridos camaradas. La Internacional Comunista y España, 1919–1939, Barcelona, 1999; and of course the archives themselves have shed further light: principally, the RGVA, RGASPI and GARF.

  5 Kowalsky, pp. 73–4.

  6 Orlov was a nom de guerre. His NKVD name was Lev Lazarovich Nikolsky, but his real name was Felbin, Leiba Lazarovich. Most Jews who joined the NKVD were ordered to take less recognizably Jewish names (GARF R-9401/12/55, pp. 211–12).

  7 From the papers of S. P. Litvinov, the radio operator for the IntelligenceDepartment of the Red Army and then the chief of radio communications at the Republican Tank Brigade under the command of D. G. Pavlov (Yury Rybalkin, Operatsiya‘X’, p. 39).

  8 See Kowalsky, pp. 42ff.

  9 Exact figures from Soviet files are hard to establish with all the conflicting sources, but in general terms the total war mate´riel supplied consisted of between 623 and 648 aircraft; between 331 and 347 tanks; between 714 and 1,228 field guns; between 338,000 and 498,000 rifles. See Howson, pp. 382–418 and Kowalsky, pp. 214–16. The Soviet Union sent six basic types of aircraft: the Polikarpov I-15 biplane fighter known in Spain as the Chato and the I-16 monoplane fighter known as the Mosca by the republicans and the Rata by the nationalists; the Tupolev SB-2 bomber known as the Katiuska and the light bomber cum reconnaissance aircraft, the Polikarpov R-5.

  10 Howson, p. 181.

  11 RGVA 35082/1/185, p. 352.

  12 See ángel Viñas, El oro de Moscú, Barcelona, 1979 and Guerra, dinero, dictadura, Barcelona, 1984; and also Pablo Martín Aceña, El oro de Moscú y el oro de Berlin, Madrid, 2001.

  13 Gabriel Jackson, however, argues that the idea of sending the gold to Moscow took the Soviet authorities by surprise and that Négrin had to explain the idea in detail to Rosenberg, the Soviet ambassador (Juan Negrín, p. 75).

  14 Its value was 598 million gold pesetas, the equivalent of $195 million (Viñas, Guerra, dinero, dictadura, p. 170).

  15 GARF 7733/36/27, pp. 25–6.

  16 Viñas, El oro de Moscú, pp. 289–92. These figures do not, however, take into account the numismatic value of many of the coins, which was considerable in the case of old Spanish and Portuguese pieces.

  17 During the course of 1937 another $256 million were transferred to the account of Eurobank in Paris. Another $131,500,000 served to pay the Soviet Union for the mate´riel which it had supplied. The balance of the gold from the Banco de España ran out early in 1938, according to the Soviet version, and in March of that year the Republic had to request from the USSR a credit of $70 million and in December another $85 million (Kowalsky, pp. 232–3).

/>   18 Seidman, A ras de suelo, p. 112; Comín et al., Historia económica de España, p. 335.

  19 RGASPI 17/120/263, pp. 2–3.

  20 Ibid., pp. 16–1.

  21 Antonov-Ovseyenko’s diary, RGASPI 17/120/84, pp. 58–79.

  22 Antonov-Ovseyenko’s confession was published in Izvestia, 24 August 1936.

  23 RGASPI 17/120/259, pp. 73–4.

  24 RGASPI 17/120/84, pp. 75–6.

  25 RGASPI 17/120/263, pp. 32.

  26 Ibid., pp. 16–17.

  CHAPTER 16: The International Brigades and the Soviet Advisers

  1 Claims arising from French Communist Party sources that Maurice Thorez, their secretary-general had somehow put forward the idea at a Comintern meeting of 26 July appear to have been completely discredited. See Rémi Skoutelsky, L’Espoir guidait leurs pas. Les voluntaires franc¸aises dans les Brigades Internationales, 1936–1939, Paris, 1998, pp. 50–1.

  2 Quoted in Elorza and Bizcarrondo, p. 303.

  3 Andreu Castells, Las Brigadas Internacionales, Barcelona, 1974, p. 449.

  4 The most accurate figures by country, but still uncertain are as follows:

  France: 8,962

  Poland: 3,113

  Italy: 3,002

  United States: 2,341

  Germany: 2,217

  Balkan countries: 2,095

  Great Britain: 1,843

  Belgium: 1,722

  Czechoslovakia: 1,066

  Baltic states: 892

  Austria: 872

  Scandinavian countries: 799

  Netherlands: 628

  Hungary: 528

  Canada: 512

  Switzerland: 408

  Portugal: 134

  Others: 1,122

  Michel Lefebvre and Re ´mi Skoutelsky, Las Brigadas Internacionales, Barcelona, 2003, p. 16.

  5 Kowalsky, p. 267.

  6 Esmond Romilly, Boadilla, London, 1971.

  7 Castells, Las Brigadas Internacionales, p. 80.

  8 Jason Gurney, Crusade in Spain, London, 1974.

  9 George Orwell, Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters, London, 1968.

  10 Abad de Santillán, Por qué perdimos la guerra, p. 175.